All+over+bar+shouting+for+comrades+in+arms,+Andrew+Feinstein,+Sindy



=All over bar shouting for comrades in arms=

The Sunday Independent, 28 October 2007

 * Andrew Feinstein** //was an MP for the ANC. But his euphoria at being part of the new South Africa slowly soured until he finally resigned in protest at the party's handling of the ams deal. The following is an extract from his new book After the Party//

On the arms deal: "Neutering the Investigation"
The ANC went to such extreme lengths to prevent an unfettered investigation into the deal because they needed to conceal corruption involving the head of procurement in the defence force at the time of the deal, at least two senior ANC leaders and probably the party itself. In addition, Mbeki would have been deeply embarrassed if it became public knowledge how negligent he and his cabinet colleagues had been and how weak the processes governing this massive procurement were, at exactly the time that he was setting out his stall as the country's first post-Mandela leader.

To this end, besides the intimidation and pressure exerted on Gavin Woods and me, the duress brought to bear on the investigators themselves was intense. The composite picture from my varied sources was of valiant attempts to conduct a meaningful inquiry amid enormous political interference and even intimidation. As one investigator put it to me, the hand of the presidency over the investigation was "palpable".

The investigators were regularly instructed as to what could and could not be scrutinised. Director of public prosecutions Bulelani Ngcuka, a former parliamentary colleague of mine, would make decisions on the basis of the political consequences.

For instance, the charge sheet for the arrest of Schabir Shaik was drawn up to charge both Shaik and Jacob Zuma. When presented to Bulelani he responded: "I will only charge the deputy president if my president agrees."

As a consequence, Zuma was not charged in spite of the fact that the indictment eventually used to charge Shaik mentioned Zuma almost as often as it did the accused. It was also made clear to the investigators that a shadowy financier close to Mbeki and Zuma who had played an ongoing role in financing the ANC was off limits.

The decision to have a public phase of the investigation, hotly contested by all the investigators I have spoken to over the years, was required because "we need something for the public", according to Ngcuka. It took what soon became a demoralised team three times as long to get anything done because of all the different levels of hierarchy that checked out what they were doing. Some of them felt personally intimidated, experiencing break-ins at their homes. New people were brought into established teams, with the incumbents fearing some of the new arrivals were intelligence operatives placed there to watch over the investigators rather than contribute to the team effort.

There was constant interference in the Tony Yengeni matter, which was clearly identified as the one minor prosecution that would satisfy the public in the hope that the whole issue would then die down.

To their credit, the prosecutors presented evidence that pointed unequivocally to a jail sentence in spite of being instructed to avoid asking for imprisonment, as "Yengeni's punishment must be such that he is able to make a return to politics".

Guidance on Modise was contradictory but a fairly detailed investigation did take place. Progress had been made on his role in the BAe deal. Even payment schedules were in the hands of the investigators. Pierre Steyn, the secretary of the defence force at the time, recently admitted that he resigned in 1998 over the deal specifically because he felt minister Modise had made up his mind before the bidding had even started and his acolytes had intervened to ensure his preferred outcome. He also felt coerced by Modise into appointing Chippy and others to their strategic positions.

In addition, another very senior defence force leader at the time claimed he had flight records showing Chippy Shaik and Joe Modise flying to London to meet with the chairman of BAe clandestinely.

When the investigator's report on Modise was brought to Ngcuka's attention, he responded: "Let's not bother with that, now that he's dead."

Most importantly, a report submitted by the investigators to their bosses recommended that corruption involving the ANC as an organisation be investigated. This was driven by myriad factors including the broader party links to Schabir Shaik and a trip that the party's treasurer-general, Mendi Msimang, made to Switzerland to meet with successful bidders. This recommendation never saw the light of day.

So, while there appears to be no ongoing South African investigation into the arms deal despite the fact that half-a-dozen partly investigated matters sit in the files of Scorpions supremo Leonard McCarthy, a number of portentous questions remain.

These include the extent to which Joe Modise, in addition to his role in Conlog, benefited from the deal, whether Chippy Shaik solicited bribes from anyone else besides ThyssenKrupp, what benefit the ANC received from any of the successful bidders and, crucial to the integrity of the ANC and government, who knew of this support and in what ways it affected the judgment of the decision-makers in the deal. To answer these questions it is crucial that South African investigators provide assistance to their international colleagues as well as pursuing Chippy and other transgressors in South African courts. Otherwise a shadow will continue to hang over the country.

The ultimate ignominy in the whole squalid arms deal affair might well be that it is investigations into the corrupters in their home countries that finally expose the actions of the corrupted in South Africa.

On the Arms deal: "A Volcanic Reaction"
Our resolution was to be tabled in the National Assembly on November 2. The ANC duty whip on the day was a garrulous old sports administrator and veteran of the National Party, the Democratic Party and finally the ANC, Jannie Momberg.

I informed Jannie that the report was being submitted and that both the deputy president and the speaker were aware of its content. In his usual inimitable manner, Jannie responded: "What kak are you causing now, Feinstein?"

Gavin, Laloo, Serake, Bruce, Nomvula and I sat anxiously on our different benches in the chamber, wondering whether Tony Yengeni might have a trick up his sleeve to scupper the adoption of the report. Vanette van Huysteen, our committee secretary, had fortunately placed our resolution in the middle of a pile of end-of-session committee reports. It was rushed through along with all the others without even a murmur.

As the parliamentary official announced that the 14th report of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts had been approved unanimously, we grinned in triumph and relief. Now the real work could begin.

Later that afternoon, I began to hear whispers about Yengeni's volcanic response when he realised what had been passed. Clearly neither the speaker, the deputy president or Jannie Momberg had informed him. Jannie came scuttling after me later that day: "Fuck, what was in that report, man? The chief has gone ballistic."

He wasn't the only one. We soon started to receive reports of the president's apoplexy.


 * A few days later, on November 8, the study group was called before a meeting of the ANC's governance committee, a body recently established to provide "political leadership" to the ANC in parliament.

It comprised the chief whip, the speakers of both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, the leader of government business (JZ), the minister in the office of the President (Essop Pahad), the president's parliamentary adviser (Charles Nqakula), the chair of the ANC caucus (Thabang Makwetla) and a range of other trusted loyalists. In addition, for this meeting, Sue Rabkin, adviser to the defence minister, was also present. Sue, the partner of Pallo Jordan, had made sure we were able to brief her boss and had privately been very supportive of our efforts. Essop Pahad objected to her presence but was overruled.

Pahad is a tall, wiry man with a mane of greying hair and small lizard-like eyes. Bluff, uncompromising and often rude, he has been close to Thabo Mbeki since they went into exile in their late teens and has been described as the only person he trusts, the president's rottweiler. As the Scopa Study Group sloped into the tense committee meeting room, Pahad was sitting with his arm around Ntsiki Mashimbye, the youthful chair of parliament's defence committee. Ntsiki's predecessor, Tony Yengeni, was on his other side. We were surprised to see Yengeni there, as we thought he had been told to keep out of this issue. JZ instructed us to sit on the opposite side of the table to them. We did so, quaking.

Mashimbye started a tirade against the study group, alleging that we didn't understand the deal and that it was a matter his committee should be dealing with. Throughout Ntsiki's harangue, Pahad was clapping him on the back as if geeing on a promising colt. We were bemused and frightened.

Johnny de Lange, the avuncular chair of the parliamentary justice committee, with whom I regularly played cricket for the aptly named Spin Doctors, weighed in that there was no evidence of impropriety and we were engaged in an unjustified fishing expedition.

In addition, he said, the investigation should not under any circumstances involve the special investigative unit of Judge Heath.

I was given a brief opportunity to try and explain the prima facie evidence that we had and the process we were following.

Within a few minutes, Pahad had launched into a ferocious diatribe, spluttering: "Who the fuck do you think you are, questioning the integrity of the government, the ministers and the president?"

Pointing aggressively at me, he shouted that we should simply withdraw the resolution. Johnny de Lange quietly pointed out that we couldn't do that, but that we should use our majority on the committee to water down the effect of the resolution and ensure that the Heath Unit was excluded from the investigating team.

Pahad then announced that he had to leave the meeting to catch a plane. With his departure, the atmosphere in the room changed. Quiet descended, a strange hush, as if a typhoon had moved on. Everyone was too stunned to react. After a few moments, for the first time in the meeting, JZ spoke. He stated calmly that he felt the study group was fulfilling its constitutional responsibility, that the organisation hadn't provided us with any leadership and that now they would.

The key point, he said, was to ensure that Judge Heath was not part of the investigating team. He proposed convening another meeting at which we would be given the opportunity to put our concerns to the relevant ministers.

The study group, with the exception of Vincent Smith, who had sat apart from us during the gruelling session with a patronising smile creasing his face, made our way to Laloo's flat next to the parliamentary precinct. We collapsed in his lounge, shattered but defiant.

One of the older comrades sat down next to me on the floor. "You know, comrade," he said softly, "many years on the island couldn't break me, but I think Thabo's ANC might."


 * The next day, details of the meeting were all over the newspapers. Someone had leaked the explosive deliberations.

Pahad described reports that he had tried to derail the investigation as "a litany of lies".

Around this time, Trevor Manuel asked me to have lunch with him. I had greatly admired his robust intellect and his courage during the struggle, and was encouraged by rumours that he had never supported the arms deal in cabinet, primarily concerned with its impact on fiscal stability.

We sat down at the appropriately named Speaker's Corner, a favoured haunt of parliamentarians.

Trevor was friendly, warm, almost intimate. He summarised the extensive work the treasury had undertaken before agreeing to the financing package, and suggested I talk directly to those officials.

Towards the end of the meal came his real point: "We all know JM [as Joe Modise was known]. It's possible that there was some shit in the deal. But if there was, no one will ever uncover it. They're not that stupid. Just let it lie. Focus on the technical stuff, which was sound."

I responded that there were even problems with the technical aspects, and warned that if we didn't get to the bottom of the deal now, it would come back to haunt us - a view I expressed over and over again within the ANC.

Another senior member of the ANC's NEC invited me to his house one Sunday. Sitting outside in the sunshine, he explained to me that I was never going to "win this thing".

"Why not?" I demanded.

"Because we received money from some of the winning companies. How do you think we funded the 1999 election?"

I didn't know what to say. I tried to think of a reason why this comrade might want to mislead me, but couldn't.

A few days later, with Pahad's harangue still ringing in our ears, members of the committee made our way to Pretoria for a meeting with the agencies we had recommended for the investigation.

The chief whip initially refused to authorise our travel expenses, but we went anyway. Before the meeting got under way, one of the investigators asked to speak to Gavin and me. He led us down through labyrinthine corridors, past rows of desks, into a basement and up to the gate … This was the secure storage area.

He unlocked the gates and asked us to take a seat. Opening a safe he withdrew a sheaf of different-sized pages.

We looked at the series of bank statements, signed letters, deposit and withdrawal slips. "This," said the investigator, "is a substantial part of the paper trail linking money from a number of the successful bidders to Joe Modise."


 * Andrew Feinstein's After the Party (Jonathan Ball) will be launched this week


 * From: http://www.sundayindependent.co.za/index.php?fArticleId=4101892**

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