COSATU+a+force+to+be+reckoned+with+Richard+Calland+S+Times

Sunday times, Johannesburg, 22 October 2006
=A force that must be reckoned with=

//In this edited extract from his forthcoming book ‘The Anatomy of South Africa: Who Holds the Power?’// **Richard Calland** //assesses the power that Cosatu wields and its impact on the body politic of the country//

IT TOOK just one call to halt a major piece of legislation. Such can be the influence of Cosatu. The head of its parliamentary office, Neil Coleman, called his boss, Zwelinzima Vavi, the general secretary of Cosatu. Then Vavi made the call — in this case, to the Cabinet minister concerned, [Safety and Security’s] Charles Nqakula. The legislation was the Anti-Terrorism Bill; the date, February 2004.

Both elements of this story are crucial to its analytical value. The context was international. After the events of September 11 2001 and the attack on the World Trade Center in New York, governments around the world were compelled to pass new legislation increasing their powers to “deal with potential terrorists”.

Many countries did so with thinly disguised zeal, seeing it as a chance to strengthen the state’s powers and to roll back the human rights protections so painstakingly acquired by activists over the past half-century. An interesting and little-known fact is that South Africa had already begun its move towards legal reform before 9/11, prompted in part by the small but ongoing threat of the far right, as well as the bombing campaign in Cape Town between 1999 and 2000.

The Bill continued to move slowly, even after September 11. By 2003, it was stuck in the National Assembly. A myriad organisations had made submissions, expressing a variety of concerns. More than 100 submissions were made and more than 50 organisations/entities were invited to make presentations before the Safety and Security committee. Cosatu was one of them.

As usual, its parliamentary office, set up in 1996 and headed since then with skill and dedication by Coleman, had made a formal submission. Since 1995, Cosatu has made over 250 submissions to parliamentary committees and government departments — it is an extraordinary record.

Recognising that power is located not just in the state apparatus but in various nodes, Cosatu identified a range of sites of struggle in which to engage in a multi-pronged approach.

This is Cosatu’s inherent strength as an organisation. Its monumental mandate — self-created — drives it into every nook and cranny of politics. The Anti-Terrorism Bill is a good example of its approach.

Because of its wide mandate, the parliamentary office has much ground to cover.

With the Anti-Terrorism Bill, it missed a beat. Substantially amended, and mostly to its satisfaction, the parliamentary office overlooked a last-minute set of additions that were added to the Bill just before it was passed by the National Assembly and then passed on to the National Council of Provinces, where the problematic amendments were challenged by Cosatu.

If Cosatu, with its relatively extensive capacity for monitoring, and its alliance connections, can be caught off-guard, what chance does everyone else have? Cosatu’s leadership was appalled.

[It was already engaged with the Anti-Terrorism Bill, and] the last-minute amendments raised it to a “life-and-death issue”, according to Coleman. His office leapt into action. Argument was presented first in an urgent submission to the NCOP committee, and then in an internal paper, dated February 20 2004. The issue was raised in the alliance — which, in formal terms, means that it was raised at the regular meeting of the three general secretaries.

Cosatu was horrified to discover that the minister concerned, Nqakula, a diligent man, was unaware of the amendments that had so enraged it. A former general secretary of the SACP and currently its national chairperson, Nqakula shared Cosatu’s concerns. He in turn made some calls ... The Bill was halted.

It must be recognised that, skilful and industrious though it is, the parliamentary office is just one of a number of entry points for Cosatu.

Moreover, although it has embraced the techniques and tactics of modern-day political lobbying, it is not the sole engine for the federation’s power. There is a “bread and butter” dimension to Cosatu’s work that can be seen most obviously in the wage-bargaining and other non-wage-related employment and sectoral negotiations by its affiliates, especially in the workplace.

Many middle-class South Africans despair of what they regard as a “strike mentality”, a view that was further encouraged by the unruly violence that accompanied the security workers’ strike and marches in May 2006. [According to South African Transport and Allied Workers Union general secretary Randall Howard], it is important to understand that “policy engagement and mass action have been seen as complementary rather than distinct strategies.

For example, strikes and demonstrations being strategically combined with detailed alternative economic proposals in the contestation of macro-economic policy. There is a saying in Cosatu that “you cannot win at the negotiating table what you have not already won on the street”.

While it may be true that government has developed the ability to shut its ears to the clamour from outside — often saying “we want solutions, not protest” — such a dual strategy serves to remind those on the other side of the negotiating table that there are numbers and potential social unrest to take into account.

Whether it is the Cosatu parliamentary office’s submissions to parliamentary committees, or the economic analysis of the policy unit headed by the widely respected Neva Makgetla, who even receives invitations to present papers to the President’s policy unit, the level of professionalism is striking.

Cosatu has 1.7 million members, spread across 21 affiliates. In terms of its leadership and its structures, what you see is pretty much what you get.

There is a national congress that meets every three years, a central committee that meets between congresses, and a central executive committee that meets three times a year. In between, decisions are taken by the office-bearers’ collective, which comprises the national president and two deputy presidents, the treasurer, general secretary and deputy general secretary. There are regional replicas of this structure and seven main departments: secretariat, organising, international, communications, education, Parliament and policy.

As I write, a new phase in ANC-Cosatu/SACP relations has commenced, ostensibly pivoted around [ANC deputy president] Jacob Zuma. Although the outcome of the divisions that have emerged in the alliance over the future career of Zuma and, specifically, his prospects of succeeding Mbeki as both president of the ANC and the country, are unknown, what is clear now is the extent to which the Zuma matter impacted on the intra-alliance relationships, especially in 2005, and especially during the important ANC national general council, held in Pretoria at the end of June 2005.

The NGC is important because it falls halfway between each national conference and represents a staging post in the monitoring of progress on national conference resolutions. Given that the ANC chooses to hold national conferences only every five years, it is an opportunity that has to be grabbed.

Hence, the 2005 NGC saw two very significant kites being flown. The first concerned a possible organisational redesign. The second, a policy document, mainly penned by [Deputy Finance Minister] Jabu Moleketi, invited the idea that there should be some retreat on the system of labour market regulation that was introduced during the Mandela administration and which the alliance regards as one of its greatest victories.

Both alliance partners are blessed with extraordinary leadership.

Zwelinzima Vavi is an awesome operator: strong, clear, hot-headed but controlled, indefatigable. Whereas with Mbhazima Shilowa, his predecessor, one detected a soft underbelly, with Vavi one senses there is only steely resolve.

This comes across clearly in his public positioning. As he himself once told senior colleagues, “We have got to display a necessary level of arrogance, given the hostile class interests stacked against us; we cannot afford to vacillate on our core issues.” [SACP general secretary] Blade Nzimande is equally astute, with a colossal intellect and a calm, measured sense of political strategy.

Neither man can be written off; both will remain key forces of influence within the ANC alliance and, therefore, throughout South African politics for the foreseeable future.

For the seasoned political gymnasts of the Cosatu and SACP leadership, the alliance with the ANC represents more of an opportunity than a threat where, like a lengthy marriage, the dividends of inside influence outweigh the habitual frustration of reproach and resentment and the occasional ritual humiliation.

Divorce is always an option. But staying together is the safer option. And it may even be the right thing to do.


 * The Anatomy of South Africa: Who Holds the Power? is published by Zebra Press


 * From: http://www.sundaytimes.co.za/articles/article.aspx?ID=ST6A213754**

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