SA+should+not+send+troops+to+Somalia,+Richard+Cornwell,+M+and+G

Mail and Guardian, Johannesburg, //19 January 2007 12:59//
=Should SA send troops to Somalia?=


 * Richard Cornwell: COUNTERPOINT**

Ethiopia’s government claims that its forces, and those of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), have routed those of the Union of Islamic Courts, and that it is preparing to withdraw its troops from Somalia in a matter of weeks. This raises the question of how a reversion to the pre-war status quo is to be avoided.

The TFG and the governments of Ethiopia and the United States have pressed for an international force, possibly under the auspices of the African Union, to provide essential support to the transitional government, practically under siege in the capital, Mogadishu.

Should the AU or some other international body deploy forces to Somalia to seize what some have depicted as a singular window of opportunity to reconstruct an effective state? If so, should South Africa take part in such a mission?

For a number of reasons, the answer to these questions should be “No”.

The deployment of an African force in Somalia to assist the TFG in building up its own security structures has been the subject of discussion virtually since its inception. Notwithstanding its recognition by international bodies and individual states, the TFG has few resources to sustain itself. Moreover, recognition is not the same thing as domestic legitimacy, though this important distinction is frequently overlooked.

The TFG’s latest victory is extremely conditional, and is likely to remain contested, especially in Mogadishu, where the Darod-led government is viewed with some hostility by the locally dominant Hawiye clan. These considerations stand apart from the likely consequences of Somali resentment at Ethiopian and US interference, and the inaccurate depiction of their campaign as an integral part of “the war on terror” designed to pre-empt the emergence of a Taliban-style state, which was hardly a possibility given Somalia’s internal dynamics.

Whether the TFG will decide to engage more moderate elements of the Islamic Courts in discussions that could lead to the formation of a broad-based government with some claim to internal legitimacy remains to be seen. Indeed, it is far from clear whether the TFG will be able to rein in those of its Mogadishu warlord allies who seem determined to recoup the material losses suffered when they were evicted from their fiefdoms by the Islamic Courts earlier in 2006.

At the time of writing, the TFG appears to be obdurate in refusing to deal even with the moderate leaders of the Islamic Courts. The crackdown on respected Somali media outlets gives cause for further concern.

No clear political outcome suggests itself that could act as a prospective base upon which international peacekeepers might be deployed, or with a clear idea of what they might be expected to achieve in advancing the security of the population of Somalia. This is problematic, for as we have seen in other theatres of military operations, the application of military force needs to be calibrated carefully in time and intensity with desired political outcomes. In Somalia, there seems to be a massive gap opening between the end of the military campaign and the construction of some sort of post-conflict order.

Yet, even if the aims and ends of such a mission become clear, it will be surprising if the AU is able to mount a sizeable or effective operation in Somalia within the next few months. Contrary to outside opinion, Africa does not dispose of numerous troops seeking useful employment. In South Africa’s case, even the current commitment of infantry to peacekeeping operations is at an unsustainable level, not to mention the need for reinforcements to the contingent in Darfur.

The layperson has very little idea of the difficulty of deploying mixed contingents in inhospitable and dangerous environments. Interoperability presents problems even for the militarily most advanced and experienced nations. As the Darfur operation has demonstrated, the AU is scarcely up to the task of running a complex force with even a limited mandate in areas where there is no peace to keep. In such a situation, the troops on the ground become hostage to the whims of local entrepreneurs of violence, complicating rather than enhancing political and diplomatic initiatives.

Should the AU decide to attempt a mission in support of the TFG, regardless of any commitment to real internal reconciliation, the troops involved will find themselves trapped in a dangerous exercise of dubious value to the Somali people as a whole.


 * //Richard Cornwell//** //is a senior research fellow at the Institute for Security Studies//


 * From: http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=296213&area=/insight/insight__comment_and_analysis/**

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