Operation+red+flag,+Moshoeshoe+Monare,+The+Star

The Star, Johannesburg, October 10, 2006 //Edition 1//
=Operation red flag. Target: Blade=

//Like the SACP, the party's general secretary is tiny but very influential in the alliance, making him the target of attack or the centre of attraction on both sides of the succession battle, argues Group Deputy Political Editor// **Moshoeshoe Monare**

During last month's ferocious lobbying to influence the outcome of Cosatu's leadership poll, South African Communist Party general secretary Blade Nzimande was a regular at the Gallagher Estate open-air restaurant with its immaculate, scenic garden.

The refreshing breeze and the serenity of the picturesque setting provided a sharp contrast to the stuffy, noisy and tense atmosphere in the conference plenary hall some 100m away. But the hushed voices, the plotting, back-stabbing, horse-trading and strategies hatched from the restaurant polluted its pristine ambience.

Nzimande was central to the so-called bush caucus, whose aim - against the backdrop of intense lobbying at the Parktonian Hotel in Joburg - was to oust Cosatu president Willie Madisha and, some say, to hijack the labour federation as a strategic weapon to influence the ANC and change the composition of the ruling party's leadership.

The youngest SACP general secretary since 1990, Nzimande lacks the gravitas and weight of his predecessors Chris Hani and Joe Slovo, but is viewed by different sides in the ANC succession battle as either a threat - or a strategic ally.

It was partly for this reason that he was the target of President Thabo Mbeki's caustic personal attack at the ANC's national executive committee (NEC) meeting at the weekend. Mbeki accused him of being "extraordinarily arrogant" and cautioned members of the NEC of the dangers of Nzimande's provocation.

Nzimande's speech at the Cosatu congress - perceived as an attack on Mbeki's presidency - forced an ANC delegation to walk out so as to caucus and strategise a response. It even hit hard inside Nzimande's party, with one of his communist colleagues privately complaining about workers "being misled by Blade".

However, Mbeki was, rather, provoked by earlier discussion documents of the SACP's central committee in which he was isolated as the main cause of the crisis within the ANC. The accusation - what they call a "1996 class project" - was that Mbeki's presidency was too dominant and not innocuous in the political battles currently being waged.

Unofficial advisers to the president saw it as a strategy to undermine his leadership and to try to propel his rival, ANC deputy president Jacob Zuma, to the top job in the ruling party. On two occasions the president carped about "people" - alliance leaders see this as a subtle reference to Nzimande - plotting to oust him.

However, Mbeki's criticism of Nzimande at the NEC meeting centred around what he saw as the communist leader's assertion that he was deviating from ANC policy. There was also inherent criticism of his leadership style.

But Nzimande is not the only one raising these issues. Others include:

And:
 * ANC secretary-general Kgalema Motlanthe. During his address at the ANC's Limpopo provincial general council recently, he warned government against deviating from ANC policy, saying this would make the ruling party fail to achieve the goals of the Freedom Charter;
 * Zuma. In his address to the SA Democratic Teachers Union recently, he said workers must guard against deviation from the Freedom Charter. He also warned against centralisation of power and suppression of debate;
 * Cosatu's general secretary Zwelinzima Vavi. He was harsh, saying that, under Mbeki, the country was drifting towards a dictatorship;
 * ANC executive member Ngoako Ramatlhodi. Although he apologised for his remarks later, he earlier accused the president of autocratic tendencies;
 * Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu. He cautioned, during the Nelson Mandela lecture, against a culture of sycophancy. The president reacted ruthlessly to the cleric.
 * Some of the ANC's members during the national general council. They rejected some of the proposals associated with Mbeki, such as modernisation of the ANC, and they questioned his prerogative in terms of presidential powers.

But why did he target Nzimande?

Despite Nzimande's sharp intellect and polemical astuteness, Mbeki commands supremacy in terms of his mastery of the art of struggle politics, including communism itself.

Despite Nzimande's egotistical outspokenness, Mbeki is a respected statesman who could paralyse his rival with his erudite and scholarly adroitness.

So, why, indeed, did the president lose his cool? Such an emotional response, says one NEC member sympathetic to Mbeki, could expose the president and the presidency to more attacks from the cacophonous fringe of Zuma supporters.

Is the thin-skinned Mbeki - who was once prodded by a junior Democratic Alliance member into a racial outburst - becoming paranoid and feeling that he is under siege?

His 12-year presidency has never been pummelled before in the way it has been over the past 15 months. Nzimande's provocation threatens his authority.

Without offices, financial backing, electoral stamina and a vast membership to challenge the ANC, Nzimande literally and figuratively operates from Cosatu, tactically exploiting its muscle and its ability to penetrate and sway the ruling party.

Although Ndzimande initially struggled to infiltrate workers, to use their power as a base from which to pound Mbeki's leadership, Zuma's brushes with the law gave the communist leader the gap to strike at his target: Mbeki.

Despite the workers seeing Zuma as an iconic figure able to rise up in the ANC without any family connections, they also used tensions around him - largely nudged by Nzimande and the Cosatu leadership - as a way to vent their emotions about their own socio-economic conditions. They were told, by Nzimande and Vavi, that Mbeki's policies were to blame.

A comfort zone at Cosatu suddenly turned the SACP, and Nzimande in particular, into a powerful force within the alliance. He is a tactical mind for the labour federation and a hazard to Mbeki.

But Nzimande's comfortable office on the third floor of Cosatu House, unlike the open-air restaurant command centre at Gallagher Estate, might be demolished, depending on who wins the succession skirmish. For now, his close ties with Vavi and Zuma, and his charismatic militant appeal to the workers, have firmly entrenched Nzimande in Cosatu - and he is using this position to his advantage.

Prior to the Cosatu congress, Nzimande called on workers to influence the direction of the ANC, even if it meant changing its leadership. But, like Mbeki, he is not entirely in control of his party as the tempest threatens his own captaincy.

One of his own party leaders, according to ANC spokesperson Smuts Ngonyama, contradicted him during the NEC meeting, even though Nzimande questioned Ngonyama's probity.

Wits sociologist and labour analyst Sakhela Buhlungu warned in a book he edited that Cosatu would split if the union decided to back the SACP, with its membership of around 40 000, in an election.

It is publicly known that SACP central committee members such as Intelligence Minister Ronnie Kasrils, Safety and Security Minister and SACP chairperson Charles Nqakula, Provincial Minister Sydney Mufamadi, Madisha and deputy chairperson Dipuo Mvelase are opposed to Nzimande's leadership.

While there are plans to purge these members, there are equally vicious plots to get rid of Nzimande at the SACP's congress in July next year, or even before that.

His key ally in the politburo is the respected former National Union of Mineworkers general secretary Gwede Mantashe, who is earmarked to replace Nqakula or even be installed as ANC secretary-general.

As was shown by the battle to oust or retain Madisha in Cosatu, the two factions of the SACP will battle it out in the next eight months … with the central figure being the diminutive Nzimande.


 * From: http://www.thestar.co.za/index.php?fArticleId=3478181**

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