Excerpts+in+memory+of+our+Cuban+comrades

**Excerpts in memory of our Cuban comrades: those who fell and all who served; and in particular appreciation of Comrades Polo Cinta Frías and Fidel Castro Ruz.**

 * Mid-1988**

‘For the South Africans and Americans the burning question was: Would the Cuban troops stop at the border? It was to answer this question that President Ronald Reagan’s Assistant Secretary for Africa, Chester Crocker, sought (head of the Cuban Civilian Mission in Angola, Jorge) Risquet. "My question is the following," he told him: "Does Cuba intend to halt the advance of its troops at the border between Namibia and Angola?" Risquet replied, "I have no answer to give you. I can’t give you a Meprobamato [a well-known Cuban tranquillizer] – not to you or to the South Africans. ... I have not said whether or not our troops will stop. ... Listen to me, I am not threatening. If I told you that they will not stop, it would be a threat. If I told you that they will stop, I would be giving you a Meprobamato, a Tylenol, and I want neither to threaten you nor to reassure you ... What I have said is that the only way to guarantee [that our troops stop at the border] would be to reach an agreement [on the independence of Namibia]."[15] On August 25, Crocker cabled Secretary of State George Shultz: "Reading the Cubans is yet another art form. They are prepared for both war and peace ... We witness considerable tactical finesse and genuinely creative moves at the table. This occurs against the backdrop of Castro’s grandiose bluster and his army’s unprecedented projection of power on the ground."[16]’

From “The Massacre of Cassinga”, **[|Piero Gleijeses]**, Professor of American Foreign Policy, John Hopkins University


 * Early 1976**

Then, the campaign started known as Operation Carlota, code name for the most just, lengthy, large scale and successful internationalist campaign undertaken by Cuba.

The empire could not achieve its aim of dismembering Angola and robbing it of its independence. The long, heroic struggle of the Angolan and Cuban peoples stopped them in their tracks.

We now know much more than we did then about how Washington thought and acted, based on official documents declassified in recent years.

At no time did the US president, or his powerful Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, or the US intelligence services, even imagined the possibility of participation by Cuba. Never before had a Third World country acted to support another people in an armed conflict beyond its geographical neighborhood.

By the end of November, enemy aggression had been halted in the north and in the south. Complete heavy armored units, substantial land and anti-aircraft artillery, armored infantry units up to brigade strength, transported by our merchant fleet, accumulated rapidly in Angola, where 36,000 Cuban troops launched a furious offensive. Attacking the main enemy in the south, they drove South Africa's racist army 1,000 kilometers back to where it came from, Angola's border with Namibia, the racist's colonial enclave. The last South African soldier left Angolan territory on March 27. In the north, Mobutu's regular troops and the mercenaries were driven back across the border with Zaire.

The truth is that Cuba was in favor of exacting a heavy price from South Africa for its adventure: the application of UN Resolution 435 and the independence of Namibia.

On the other hand, the Soviets, worried about possible US reaction, were putting strong pressure on us to make a rapid withdrawal.

After raising strong objections, we were obliged to accede, at least partially, to the Soviet demands. Although not consulted about our decision to send troops to the Republic of Angola, the Soviet Union had subsequently decided to supply arms for the emerging Angolan army and had agreed to some of our requests for material aid during the hostilities. Angola's post-victory prospects without the political and logistic support of the USSR were non-existent.

Dr **Fidel Castro Ruz**, December 2, 2005, 30th Anniversary of Cuban Military Mission in Angola, and 49th Anniversary of the landing of the "Granma"


 * Late 1987 to 1988**

History repeated itself. The enemy, greatly emboldened, advanced strongly, towards Cuito Cuanavale, an old NATO airbase. Here it prepared to deliver a mortal blow against Angola.

Desperate calls were received from the Angolan government appealing to the Cuban troops for support in fending off presumed disaster; it was unquestionably the biggest threat from a military operation in which we, as on other occasions, had no responsibility whatever.

Titanic efforts by the Cuban political and military high command, despite the serious threat of hostilities which hung over us as well, resulted in assembling the forces needed to deliver a decisive blow against the South African forces. As in 1975, our homeland rose to the occasion. A flood of troops and weaponry rapidly crossed the Atlantic, landing on Angola's south coast in order to attack in the south west, in the direction of Namibia. At the same time, 800 km to the east, special units advanced towards Cuito Cuanavale, where they joined up with retreating Angolan forces to set up a lethal trap for the powerful South African forces heading for that large airbase.

This time, Cuban troops in Angola numbered 55,000.

So while in Cuito Cuanavale the South African troops were bled, to the southwest 40,000 Cuban and 30,000 Angolan troops, supported by some 600 tanks, hundreds of pieces of artillery, 1,000 anti-aircraft weapons and the daring MIG-23 units that secured air supremacy, advanced towards the Namibian border, ready to literally sweep up the South African forces deployed along that main route.

A great deal could be said about all the engagements and incidents in that campaign.

Here with us are Comrade Polo Cinta Frías, the bold commander of the Angola southern front at that time, and many comrades who took part in the actions of those glorious, unforgettable days.

The resounding victories in Cuito Cuanavale, especially the devastating advance by the powerful Cuban contingent in southwest Angola, spelled the end of foreign aggression.

The enemy had to set aside its usual arrogance and sit down at the negotiating table. The talks culminated in the Peace Accords for Southern Africa, signed by South Africa, Angola and Cuba at the UN headquarters in December 1988.

The accords were designated as quadripartite, since the Angolans and the Cubans sat on one side of the table with the South Africans opposite; the United States occupied a third side, given its role as mediator. In reality, America was judge and party, an ally of the apartheid regime. Its rightful place was alongside the South Africans.

The head of the US delegation, undersecretary Chester Crocker, for years opposed Cuba's participation. But given the seriousness of the military situation for the South African aggressors, he had no choice but to accept our presence. In a book he wrote about these events, he was quite right in observing that when the Cuban delegates entered the conference room, the talks were about to change for good.

This Reagan administration spokesman was well aware that with Cuba at the negotiating table, dirty tricks, blackmail, intimidation and lies would not succeed.

Dr **Fidel Castro Ruz**, December 2, 2005, 30th Anniversary of Cuban Military Mission in Angola and 49th Anniversary of the landing of the “Granma”

1212 words